Modernising Corporate Reporting to support long-term economic growth: Ellason LLP response

Introduction and summary

Thank you for providing us with the opportunity to respond to the consultation on Modernising Corporate Reporting to support long-term economic growth (“the Consultation”).

Ellason supports the Consultation’s objective to simplify and modernise corporate reporting in the UK. Our field of expertise is executive remuneration. In our view, the proposed disclosure changes would broadly simplify reporting and give companies greater flexibility to determine what information is relevant and how it can be presented most usefully to shareholders and other stakeholders.

In addition to the disclosure changes, the Consultation proposes changes to the voting regime on remuneration. In our view, there is no need for both a binding triennial Remuneration Policy vote and an annual advisory vote on the Directors’ Remuneration Report (“DRR”). Simplification and increased competitiveness would be better achieved by either removing the requirement for the Remuneration

Policy vote instead of removing the annual advisory vote on the DRR, or extending the time limit before which the Policy needs to be brought back to shareholders for approval. We believe that either of these approaches provides greater flexibility to companies to react to commercial and market developments while still preserving shareholder scrutiny and accountability.

Introduction to Ellason

Ellason is an independent reward consultancy specialising in executive remuneration. Ellason advises both public and private companies and is the appointed advisor to the remuneration committees of a significant proportion of the FTSE350. Our advisory experience spans Remuneration Policy design and implementation, drafting and reviewing DRRs, and supporting shareholder engagement. This practical experience informs our response to the Consultation, bringing a corporate advisory perspective to the implications of the proposed changes for remuneration reporting and shareholder engagement. Ellason is a member of the Remuneration Consultants Group and provides independent advice to clients.

Ellason’s response addresses only the remuneration proposals set out in Section 7 of the Consultation, reflecting our expertise in executive remuneration.

Overview

The foundations of the UK’s formalised remuneration reporting framework were established by the Greenbury Report in 1995, which recommended a dedicated remuneration committee report to shareholders under a voluntary code of best practice. Reporting requirements have evolved substantially since then. The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002 made the DRR a statutory requirement for quoted companies, alongside an annual advisory shareholder vote. Reforms in 2013 established the current two-vote framework: a binding vote on the forward-looking Remuneration Policy, at least every three years, and an annual advisory vote on the report of its implementation.

This evolution, as well as further reporting amendments introduced in 2018 and 2019, has significantly increased the volume and scope of disclosure. The original emphasis was on providing shareholders with a transparent account of executive remuneration decisions and the information needed to hold remuneration committees to account. Subsequent requirements have extended reporting to broader matters beyond that focus.

In Ellason’s view, the Consultation provides an opportunity to refocus statutory reporting on information that helps stakeholders understand and assess executive remuneration decisions, while reducing the length and complexity of reports.

We comment on the individual disclosure proposals below, including those which we support. We are broadly supportive of the overall direction and consider that implementing the disclosure proposals, even without our suggested amendments, would represent a helpful streamlining of remuneration reporting requirements.

However, we do not support the proposed changes to the shareholder voting framework. Removing the annual advisory vote risks undoing the good governance and engagement practices built up over the last decade. Doing so also has the potential to lead to unintended consequences, including redirecting shareholder concerns towards the re-election of the Remuneration Committee Chair or the Remuneration Policy itself, rather than providing a direct means of holding companies accountable for remuneration decisions.

We encourage exploration of an alternative approach: retaining the annual advisory vote on the DRR and either removing the binding Remuneration Policy vote or extending the time limit before which the Policy needs to be brought back to shareholders for approval. If the requirement for a Policy vote is removed, this would effectively return to a pre-2013 position, but with the benefit of the last 13 years’ advances in good governance practices and established expectations around executive pay. Although advisory, the annual vote on the DRR carries significant reputational consequences and, therefore, this alone provides an effective mechanism for promoting accountability and encouraging companies to maintain strong shareholder support. Alternatively, if the Remuneration Policy vote is retained, we recommend that the requirement for approval once every three years is either dropped or extended, to allow companies to submit the Policy to a shareholder vote only when changes are required, rather than forcing a review and a time-consuming engagement process at an arbitrary interval of at least every three years.

Question response

Q37. Do you agree or disagree with the government’s proposals to retain these elements of the remuneration reporting in the directors’ remuneration report? Please explain your answer.

- The annual disclosure of total single remuneration for each director, together with the Statement from the Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

Agree. The total single figure is widely understood and comparable across companies. The Chair’s statement provides useful narrative context: explaining remuneration decisions, shareholder engagement activities and outcomes, and workforce considerations.

- Disclosure of the performance measures applied to the previous year’s pay awards

Agree. This information should be kept as it is important to understand what management has been incentivised to achieve and how this reinforces the stated business strategy.

- The forward-looking directors’ remuneration policy

Agree. It is important that remuneration disclosure is not solely focused on historic decisions based on past performance.

- The performance graph showing CEO pay alongside Total Shareholder Return over the past ten years.

Disagree. We do not support retaining the 10-year Total Shareholder Return (TSR) chart in its current form. It provides a one-dimensional view of performance that alone does not always explain the relationship between performance and pay outcomes. Investors can also readily obtain TSR and share price information elsewhere. The chart can be misleading because its timeframe differs from the period over which long-term performance is typically assessed, usually three years.

Q38. The government proposes to retain the existing methodologies for calculating the total single figure directors receive (including salary, bonus, share options and other benefits) but are interested in ways in which they could be refined – for example, through the inclusion of a de minimis threshold. Do you agree or disagree with this proposal? Please explain your answer.

No change necessary. The current approach to calculating the total single figure is well understood and is no longer considered particularly onerous to calculate. One potential simplification would be to update the requirement to restate prior year figures that were estimated (Schedule 8, Part 3, paragraph 9(2)), so that it only applies to changes in the performance outcomes. If the award has not yet vested at the time of finalising the annual report, companies are currently required to estimate the share price on vesting using the three-month average share price immediately prior to the year-end and then to update this calculation in the following year’s DRR to reflect the actual vest date share price. This restatement provides limited value for shareholders, particularly since the shares are typically subject to additional holding requirements and therefore the restated value does not represent that which ultimately will be realised by the executive directors. We recommend that the restatement requirement is therefore limited to changes in the performance outcome only.

A de minimis threshold is already available in respect of payments for loss of office and payments to past directors. In our experience, it is rarely used, and we therefore do not see value in introducing a similar threshold for the total single figure.

Q39. Do you agree or disagree with the government’s proposals to streamline (to refine or simplify) these elements of the remuneration reporting in the directors’ remuneration report? Please explain your answer.

- The requirement to include information on how the policy will be implemented the following year

Disagree. The disclosure should be retained. Removing it, particularly alongside the proposed removal of the annual advisory vote, could create a three-year period during which a company implements its Policy in a manner that shareholders do not support or expect. Shareholders may therefore seek more prescriptive Policy reports (which we argue would run counter to the principle that the Policy should define the limits within which a remuneration committee has an approved mandate to operate), or use other avenues to demonstrate dissatisfaction, such as opposing individual director re-elections.

- The requirement to disclose information on directors’ accumulated shareholding interests in the company over time.

Disagree. This disclosure should be retained as it demonstrates executive directors’ alignment with shareholders and it is difficult for shareholders to ascertain a complete picture of an executive director’s aggregate interest in shares from London Stock Exchange RNS announcements (as these report only movements in share interests rather than the aggregate holding itself).

Q40. Do you agree or disagree with the government’s proposals to remove these elements of the remuneration reporting in the directors’ remuneration report? Please explain your answer.

- CEO-employee pay ratio;

Agree. Preparing this disclosure is resource intensive, as the information is typically not used for other purposes in the business. In our experience, remuneration committees already assessed the appropriateness of pay structures, internal relativities and wider workforce pay using other metrics more relevant to determining whether pay structures are appropriate, before publication of the CEO pay ratio was mandated.

Removal of this disclosure requirement does not mean that companies will cease considering these factors or that the requirement to inform shareholders will disappear. Provision 41 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (“the Code”) requires companies to explain why remuneration is appropriate in the context of internal and external factors, including pay ratios. Therefore, companies will still be required to consider pay relativities, but the more flexible nature of the Code enables companies to prepare information in a manner that is relevant to their specific circumstances.

- the relative importance of spend on pay;

Agree. Remuneration is a significant business cost, but the relevant information is available elsewhere in the Annual Report. Repeating it in the DRR therefore adds little value.

- executive directors’ pay prior to the company becoming a listed company;

Agree. This information is already provided in the Prospectus and is not relevant to forward-looking pay.

- the illustration of long-term incentive plan outcome in the event of 50% share price appreciation during the performance period results, which results in an artificial maximum executive pay figure that is not useful for investors;

Agree. An assumed 50% share price increase is artificial and therefore does not add value to the DRR.

- information on the work of the remuneration committee, including disclosure of any parties providing advice to it;

Agree. In our view, this disclosure can be boilerplate and may add little to shareholders’ assessment of the remuneration committee’s decision-making. Provision 41 of the Code requires a more meaningful description of the remuneration committee’s work, explaining how decisions were made rather than simply listing the actions taken during the year.

Disclosure of remuneration consultants and any other connections they have with the company is expected under Provision 35 of the Code as part of the principle of safeguarding the independence and objectivity of the remuneration committee's decision-making. In our view, the Code sufficiently addresses disclosure of remuneration consultants and their connections with the company, and therefore the corresponding regulatory requirements can be removed while retaining this transparency.

- malus and clawback policies, and any use of malus and clawback in the previous year;

Disagree. Malus and clawback are important mechanisms in mitigating payment for failure. Removing the disclosure requirement may, therefore, be interpreted as softening an important governance safeguard. Shareholders should be given information on both the policy and the circumstances in which malus and clawback have been applied or their application considered. Although Provision 38 of the Code requires disclosure of malus and clawback provisions, in our view this requirement should remain a statutory requirement rather than be addressed through the Code’s ‘comply or explain’ framework.

The disclosure requirements for malus and clawback are captured in different sections of the regulations (Part 3, paragraph 8(2) and Part 4, paragraph 26(e)). To improve the quality and accessibility of this information, the company’s approach to malus and clawback could instead be presented in a single section of the DRR.

- how the remuneration committee has engaged with shareholders on pay proposals;
- how the remuneration committee has engaged with employees on pay proposals;
- how directors’ remuneration aligns with wider employee pay policies;

Agree. As noted above, Provision 41 of the Code requires companies to explain the work of the remuneration committee, including its actions and considerations in relation to shareholder engagement, employee engagement and the alignment of directors’ remuneration with wider employee pay policies. In our view, the Code provides sufficient coverage of these matters.

- how a company is addressing any significant shareholder dissent on a vote on directors’ remuneration;
- the requirement to disclose results of annual shareholder votes on directors’ remuneration.

Disagree. Disclosure of shareholder voting results and the company’s response are important accountability mechanisms that require companies to explain how they have responded to shareholders’ concerns.

Q41. Please indicate whether and, if so, how you think the proposals on retaining, reforming or removing the elements could be improved.

Our suggested improvements are set out in the responses above. These include simplifying the requirement to restate estimated prior-year single figures, retaining forward-looking implementation and shareholding disclosures, and presenting malus and clawback information in a single section of the DRR.

Q42. Does the current scope for reporting (‘quoted companies’) remain appropriate? Please explain your answer.

No. The scope for reporting should be limited to UK incorporated companies (as that is within the remit of UK legislation) that are listed on the London Stock Exchange. Remuneration reporting for UK incorporated companies listed outside the UK should be determined by the rules of the market in which they seek to attract investment.

Q43. Do you agree or disagree with the proposal to remove the shareholders’ annual advisory vote on the directors’ remuneration report? Please explain your answer.

Disagree. In principle, a shareholder vote on remuneration should not be necessary: non-executive directors act as independent fiduciary stewards and are responsible for promoting the company’s success for shareholders’ benefit, including through the remuneration decisions they make. However, shareholder voting on pay has been a feature for more than 20 years and is now well established. Shareholders value it as a direct means of holding companies to account. We therefore recognise that removing shareholder voting altogether is not a realistic option at this stage.

In line with the Consultation’s objectives of simplifying reporting, reducing administrative burdens and making UK companies more attractive to investors, we recommend retaining the annual advisory vote and instead removing the triennial binding Remuneration Policy vote. This would give non-executive directors greater flexibility, particularly on recruitment, to respond to the company’s remuneration needs. The annual vote could be supported by a forward-looking statement explaining how executive directors will be remunerated in the coming year (as we suggest elsewhere in this response), and the shareholder vote on long-term incentive plans under the UK Listing Rules will remain. Regular shareholder scrutiny and accountability would therefore be preserved.

Although the current annual vote is not legally binding, it carries significant reputational consequences and provides a clear means for shareholders to express support for, or concerns about, remuneration outcomes. If the vote were removed, as the Consultation proposes, investors we have engaged with have indicated that they would be likely to express those concerns by opposing other resolutions, such as the re-election of directors. Retaining the annual vote ensures that shareholders’ views on remuneration are expressed through the resolution to which they directly relate. As additional context on this point, ‘Say on Frequency’ voting outcomes in the US overwhelmingly show that investors prefer an annual vote*.

Should the Consultation conclude that both votes should be retained, we recommend removing the three-year approval cycle for the Remuneration Policy. This would avoid companies undertaking a resource-intensive Policy review when company circumstances do not require it. Companies should seek approval for a new Policy only when they need to amend an existing Policy, rather than being bound by the expiry of an arbitrary three-year period. This mirrors the approach taken for long-term incentive plans, for which shareholder approval is granted for a ten-year period. This approach has not led to concerns from shareholders.

Retaining the annual advisory vote would also impose little additional burden. In our experience, putting the resolution to shareholders takes little time at the AGM, and shareholder engagement would continue regardless of whether the annual advisory vote is retained. We therefore challenge the Consultation’s rationale that removing it would free up sufficient time or resources to have a material impact on other parts of the AGM.

Q44. Do you have any further comment on the government's proposals in this remuneration reporting section? Are there any other suggestions that the government should consider?

No further comments in relation to the Consultation. However, to support the Consultation’s objectives of simplification and increasing UK competitiveness, we recommend reviewing the UK Corporate Governance Code to ensure it is aligned with those objectives.

* 96% of the most recent S&P500 votes on Say on Frequency result in one year being the first choice of shareholders (source: Diligent)

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